

## **Contours of inequality: Cross-national minority penalties**

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### **Abstract:**

Given historical differences in legal and political treatment of minority groups across countries, systematic differences exist in how minority groups fare in different countries. These differences, however, are not easily detectable. While some comprehensive efforts have been made to diagnose 'ethnic penalties,' such approaches have, to-date, focused on specifying the smallest racial/ethnic-generation group possible. While this approach is ideal for understanding intra-country disadvantage, it introduces an endogeneity problem that makes cross-national comparison and understanding of racial/ethnic penalties difficult. Further, fair or equal employment regulations do not clear-cut disadvantage for all groups at all labor market junctures. Rather, cross-nationally, different fair employment regimes may well induce new and different patterns of amelioration. This paper suggests an alternative approach to understanding the contours of inequality cross-nationally, focusing on a series of binary minority/non-minority classifications that relate minority status more directly to legal and political mechanisms. This series of functionally equivalent political minority variables allows for more direct comparison across countries. Then, this paper begins to examine the contours of inequality across three countries: the Canada, Great Britain and the US. Using the recent data from each country (2000 Census data for the US, 2001 Census data for Canada and pooled 1996-2003 General Household Surveys for Great Britain), this paper begins to sketch out the contours of racial/ethnic inequality in each country, and compare this inequality across the three countries.

Given historical differences in legal and political treatment of minority groups across countries, systematic differences exist in how minority groups fare in different countries. These patterns of labor market discrimination however and are not easily detected. While some attempts to compare ethnic penalties or evidence of discrimination across countries has been done, most recently and comprehensively by Heath & Cheung (2007), few efforts have been taken to systematize an approach for comparing minority or “ethnic” penalties across different countries, with different political structures engendering different types of minorities. As such, this paper proposes a new approach to studying cross-national differentials in minority penalties, by defining (non-mutually-exclusive) categories of political minorities that are functionally equivalent across countries. In so doing, this paper will attempt two distinct goals: first, providing evidence that a striking degree of labor market discrimination persists against some—if not all—political minority groups in all three countries under study; and second, to explore some early evidence of differences in minority labor market penalties across countries, potentially linked to differences in political institutions or policies.

### **Discrimination & ethnic penalties: An overview**

The equality of minority groups has been one of the defining struggles of the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, continuing into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The broadest considerations of such equality discuss notions of ‘life chances’, examining whether and to what extent minorities have struggled to maximize such chances, from birth to death. Further, as generations of minorities have passed on, minority life chances have been the focus of many studies on social mobility, or to what extent ethnic minority progeny are able to improve upon the life chances of their parents.

Continued evidence of discrimination in the labor market, then, flies in the face of efforts by particular minority groups or individuals to overcome such hurdles, as individual decisions or choices aimed at maximizing life chances are counteracted by parties deeming certain individuals ‘undeserving’ of or ‘undesirable’ for certain opportunities. Passing laws and policies that most efficiently quell discriminatory behavior in the labor market, as such, carries both a ‘rights’-oriented inherency, in allowing all individuals equal access to opportunities at maximizing life chances, as well as an economic inherency, as discrimination holds the potential to introduce inefficiencies into the marketplace if better ascriptive characteristics are allowed to impede the translation of equivalent skills into equivalent labor market value.

Although some scholars of social mobility have argued that the discrimination paradigm writ large “has become less important as an explanatory schema ... over the past quarter-century” (Loury, Modood and Teles 2005: 4), in terms of considerations of equality, evidence of discrimination flies in the face of neo-liberal conceptions of equality, or equality of opportunity without consideration of ascriptive characteristics. For example, while evidence of continued African-American disadvantage in educational attainment in the US is certainly troubling, few Americans would likely find it troubling that this differential in educational attainment leads to a systematic differential in labor market outcomes; rather, such stratification on education would likely be seen as meritocratic and ‘just,’ if perhaps unfortunate. However, evidence of lower labor market success for African-American college graduates compared to White college graduates would likely rather raise questions as to why such stratification was occurring, suggesting at least *a priori* evidence of potentially unjust inequality.

Nonetheless, in spite of the social value of both recognizing and eradicating discriminatory labor market behavior, social science-based ‘evidence’ of discrimination is often hard to come by, for several reasons. First, researchers who study minority equality and mobility are generally quite keen to point out that multiple factors contribute to sub-optimal outcomes for minority groups, and not all are ‘demand side’. Rather, many ‘supply side’ differences, for example in language ability, cultural norms, or residential geography, also contribute to gross levels of minority inequality. As such, evidence of discrimination generally requires an accounting for these gross differences to arrive at a ‘net’ disadvantage—often referred to as a ‘penalty.’

Second, definitions of what counts as ‘discrimination’ have changed—and continue to change—over the past 50 years. Early theories of discrimination came out of economics, with economists interested in why or under what conditions ‘discrimination’—fundamentally an intrapsychic, cognitive phenomenon—would lead to systematic group-level inequalities. Becker’s (1957) ‘taste for discrimination’ model argued that individuals develop ‘tastes’ for certain groups of people or certain characteristics that induce a ‘disamenity value’ for groups deemed ‘distasteful.’ Thus, hiring a worker from a minority class is generally only ‘rational’ if that worker can overcome such disamenity by taking lower pay or working harder. Later models of statistical discrimination (Aigner & Cain 1977) moved beyond Becker’s argument, arguing instead that because employers in hiring situations are dealing with incomplete information, they are forced to look beyond individual applicants in considering their chances of ‘success;’ thus they often look to differences in, e.g., ascriptive group-level means or variances. As such,

a minority group with a less successful labor market history will continue to be disadvantaged by this past in present employment situations.

Such economic models of discrimination have largely fallen out of favor in understanding processes behind labor market inequality, especially for sociologists. For one, both models take some level of group-level difference as a given—for Becker, this is an assumed ‘taste’ preference for white workers over other ethnic minority groups; for Aigner & Cain, it is different means and/or variances in measurable ‘skill’ amongst ethnic groups. From a sociological perspective these differences are not taken as intrinsic ‘givens’ but rather remain to be explained. Nonetheless, economic models initially proved highly influential in elucidating why it would be within business’s ‘best interest’ to directly exclude members of minority groups from the labor market. As such, these models shaped both early understandings of discrimination —via understandings of ‘direct’ discrimination, premised on employer ill-intent—and early policy responses. As such, early policy suggestions focused on the threat of sanctions for employers who discriminated, in an effort to counterbalance any ‘disamenity’ held by minority groups, or to offset informational shortcomings faced by minority groups in attempting labor market entry.

More recent legal and sociological understandings of discrimination, however, have called for a move onwards from intra-psychic ‘motive’-based processes to ‘organizational’ processes—or the specific ways that employers might be able to link ascriptive or identity characteristics with employment opportunities. Legally, discrimination in both the international arena and in most domestic arenas no longer relies on *intent* (via so-called direct discrimination); rather, proof of a disparate impact of workplace policy on a particular group can be considered both necessary and sufficient for a claim of discrimination (via *indirect discrimination*). This policy shift has been echoed with a shift in sociological research, as scholars have called for work to move away from ‘who discriminates’ to ‘how are employers able to discriminate’—again, moving focus from individuals with particular motivations to organizational processes that continue to allow for a consideration of ascriptive characteristics (cf. Reskin 2003; Baron 1984). This shift in focus is undoubtedly important in examining discrimination in the long term as it opens the door for understanding the mechanisms by which groups continue to be systematically excluded from labor market opportunities—even despite the best of motives (cf. Schelling 1978)—and may set the stage for future policy initiatives.

While this broader definition of discrimination goes far towards legitimating the basic rights of personhood for groups at-risk for discrimination, it also complicates the type of ‘gold-standard’ evidence necessary for diagnosing discrimination. Audit studies, for example, while providing some of the clearest evidence of discrimination, are generally only capable of detecting direct discrimination—or an intent to discrimination—based on characteristics systematically identified with a particular minority group, such as names. Nonetheless, even audit studies continue to provide evidence of discrimination in the US, Canada and Great Britain (see, for example, (Pager 2007, Mincy 1993, Bendick, Jackson & Reinoso 1994 in the US; Riach and Rich 1991-92 in Great Britain).

Detection of indirect discrimination, or discrimination premised not on motive or ill-intent but disproportionate impact, may require statistical evidence of such disproportionate impact as a initial—albeit imperfect—evidence. As such, econometric models of ‘ethnic penalties’ in the labor market have recently become commonplace (cf. Heath & McMahon 1997; Berthoud 2000; Carmichael & Woods 2000; Heath & Cheung 2007). Such models estimate labor market success—generally via multiple dependent variables, such as likelihood of unemployment, social class and/or income—controlling for typical indicators of economic success (e.g., age, education, marital status, gender) in addition to designations of race or ethnicity. Significant coefficients for particular racial or ethnic groups are then considered to approximate ‘penalties’ (or ‘premiums’, as appropriate) for each ethnic group. Such penalties are not, as such, considered tantamount to evidence of discrimination, but are offered considered ‘upper-bound’ estimates for levels of discrimination (Heath & Cheung 2007).

While country-specific investigations of ethnic penalties thus provide crucial information about how groups are faring within a particular labor market, a cross-national examination of such penalties allows us to incorporate macro-level considerations into considerations of discrimination and equality, in two ways. First, cross-national differences in terms of who ‘can be’ discriminated against—i.e., how minority groups are classified and measured—can be examined. In addition, however, the import of different macro-level variables—such as laws, policies or procedures—can also be considered. Fair employment regulation provides an ideal example of such macro-level policies, as such regulation becomes a contextual variable, simultaneously working to rectify inequality within a given nation-state while also —and perhaps unintentionally—shaping inequality through regulation that targets some groups, processes and/or labor market outcomes but not others.

This paper will show provide some early evidence of these contours of this inequality, first by examining which groups in each country have been the focus of research on discrimination and ethnic disadvantage; and second by examining each country under study using a method that more directly compares in-group/out-group disadvantage across multiple groups.

### **Cross-national differences in defining minorities & evidence of discrimination**

In spite of consensus in terms of how ethnic penalties models should be specified and even interpreted, complexities persist when trying to compare such models across multiple countries or contexts. For one, different countries are populated differently, with different representations of ethnic and racial groups. Further, however, processes of problematization can create cross-national differences in how ethnic or racial differences are operationalized for scrutiny by governments or official bodies. A strong movement supporting the extension of rights for one particular group may focus attention on one group suffering from disadvantage, but ignore other groups suffering similar levels of disadvantage. In the US, for example, equal employment rights were extended to Black Americans following the Civil Rights movement, but it took much longer for Hispanic groups to ‘prove’ that they were also worthy of consideration for fair employment policy extensions (Skrentny 2002).

Table 1 presents the ethnic/racial makeup of the three countries under consideration by this paper—the US, Great Britain and Canada, as measured and presented by national Census bodies. As the table shows, the ‘dominant’ (or presumably ‘baseline’) group in each state has been defined differently. In the US, the dominant group has been defined in terms of both race and ethnicity—White and non-Hispanic, embracing both positive and negative definitions of dominance. In Canada, the definition has been entirely negative—delineating those who are either a ‘visible’ minority or aboriginal from those who are neither. Such a definition has necessarily focuses regulatory efforts on those minorities who are ‘visibly’ different from the dominant group, ruling out the potential for white minority groups (such as the Quebecois) who may be worthy of regulatory attention. Britain, meanwhile, focuses its dominant group on ancestry, likely because of its colonial history, but in doing so creates arguably the most ambiguous reference group—hence the large percentage of the British population defined by ‘multiple’ ancestries (9.5%).

<<Table 1 about here>>

Such differing operationalizations in official statistics matter, both for reasons related to individual identity often cited by proponents for change in official statistics, but also for understanding how and why policy interventions related to equality occur, which groups are most affected, and what lasting effects the legislation may or may not have. For example, the British delineation between majority and minority is premised on ancestry, which means policies would be more likely to focus on immigrant populations, and less likely to distinguish between, e.g., ancestral whites and ancestral non-whites. Conversely, the US and Canadian distinctions build in 'visible' racial differences, regardless of native ancestry. In addition, as the next section will show, such official designations often also offer justification for focusing on particular groups in searching for evidence of discrimination.

#### **Prior research: Cross-national examination of ethnic penalties**

Research on ethnic penalties in each of the US, Canada and Great Britain is well established, and a full overview outside of the purview of this paper. However, such work highlights a number of idiosyncracies and patterns within each country relevant to the considerations here.

Research on ethnic penalties in Canada second only in volume to such research in the US. The focus of much of this work has been on delineating evidence of penalties for two particular (and overlapping) groups: visible minorities, defined by Canadian legislation as including individuals identifying as Black, South Asian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Southeast Asian, Filipino, Arab/West Asian, or Latin American (Statistics Canada 2005); and immigrants. Labor market fortunes of Canadian Aboriginals have also been the source of recent inquiry. Given Canada's history, neither of these foci is surprising. Following the autonomy granted by the 1867 British North America Act, expanding Canada's labor force via immigration from Europe became a high priority (Yu & Heath 182; Fleras & Elliot 1996: 290-1; Simmons 1999: 42; Kelley & Trebilcock 2000: 13). The Canadian government actively sought immigrants, offering free land, and immigrants were welcomed as citizens, with protected, permanent rights (Reitz 1988; Richmond 1990). A steady flow of immigrants has continued into the Canadian economy since

this point, peaking in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, establishing Canada as “rightly referred to as a country of immigration” (Yu & Heath 2007: 185).

Most work on ethnic penalties in Canada has focused on wage differentials (or ‘gaps’) as the dependent variable, and studies have repeatedly found that visible minorities and aboriginals experience wage penalties in comparison to native whites, even net of considerations of, e.g., productivity (Hum & Simpson 1999; Christofides & Swidinsky 2001). Although some heterogeneity has been found amongst ‘visible minorities’ in terms of the size of the wage penalty (Pendakur & Pendakur 1998), such penalties do appear to be persistent, with research from the 2001 Census showing the wage gap for both visible minorities and aboriginals increasing since the 1980s (Pendakur & Pendakur 2002; 2007).

Other work has focused on immigrant status and its relationship to ethnic penalties. Yu & Heath (2007) use the 2001 Census 2.7% PUMS to explore ethnic penalties with regard to unemployment, salariat access and returns to education. Although they focus their account on generational improvement within immigrant groups, their evidence shows that while most second-generation immigrants do not face significant labor market penalties, a large number of first-generation immigrants do face such penalties—and additionally so do a number of visible minority groups, such as Lebanese, Indians, Caribbeans and Africans, irrespective of generation. A recent report by the Canadian Labour and Business Centre (2003) further shows that immigrants into Canada face what they term a ‘transition penalty’ in gaining employment upon arrival in Canada, and that while this penalty is most severe upon first arrival, it remains significant and substantial even five years on (12.7% unemployed amongst immigrants vs. 7.4% amongst native Canadians). In addition, such a substantial penalty is a fairly recent phenomenon and was not found for immigrants in 1981 (Lochhead 2003). Further, Bloom et al. (1995) also show that immigrants arriving between 1981 and 1986 also had a harder time achieving economic parity (or assimilating) with their native British-origin counterparts than did cohorts of immigrants who arrived before 1981.

These two strands of research—examining visible minorities and immigrants—has continued to show persistent disadvantage amongst both groups, but has also failed to identify the specific mechanisms behind this disadvantage. As these groups within Canada—visible minorities and immigrants—tend to overlap to a sizeable degree, research demonstrating penalties for one particular ethnic/racial-generation does little to overcome the

implicit 'identification problem'. As such, different studies have resulted in different policy recommendations about which groups are not being adequately protected.

Yu & Heath (2007) also present evidence of significant ethnic penalties for both Canadian aboriginals and the French charter population and self-identified 'Canadian'<sup>1</sup> population. The aboriginal gap is noteworthy as prior research has referred to the aboriginal wage gap as 'relatively small' compared to other well-studied wage gaps (e.g., men vs. women) and largely accounted for by gross differentials in human capital, such as education and language (George & Kuhn 1994; Kuhn & Sweetman 2002; de Silva 1999) rather than 'discriminatory' labor market behavior. Nonetheless, Yu & Heath show large net penalties for aboriginals across a variety of outcome variables and for both genders. Indeed, the penalties they show with regard to unemployment are larger than any penalty experienced by first-generation immigrant groups. The charter French population and third-generation self-identified 'Canadian' population also show significant penalties with regard to unemployment avoidance and salariat access, net of econometric predictors, when compared to the charter British. This evidence likely indicates a continuing disadvantage for the native Quebecois population, however the authors do not discuss either of these penalties in detail. It does, however, echo other research indicating persistent—and widening—wage gaps between Anglophones and unilingual Francophones between 1971 and 1991 (Shapiro & Stelcner 1997).

### *Great Britain*

Unlike Canada, in Britain interest in ethnic penalties has been tied almost exclusively to two groups: visible minorities and the Irish. Generally interest in immigrant groups has been less important than in countries like the US and Canada, likely because Great Britain had, until recently, fairly lax immigrant policies, but also because Britain's colonial history created a different understanding of a workforce who came and went from different parts of the globe. Nonetheless, heterogeneity amongst visible minorities has been a concern, especially in terms of gross disadvantage. Africans, for example, exhibit some of the most impressive levels of human capital, while Afro-Caribbeans and Bangladeshis often fall significantly behind the native British in terms of gross credentials.

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<sup>1</sup> The addition of a self-identified 'Canadian' category (in lieu of individuals identifying as charter British or French) has been controversial, and to-date little is known about what type of individuals choose to identify as Canadian as opposed to British or French. As such, until the group of individuals who opt for this identification is better understood, it is difficult to say much about evidence of penalties for third-generation Canadians.

A variety of studies have shown that visible minority groups have been disadvantaged in the British labor market (cf. Berthoud 2000; Carmichael & Woods 2000; Heath and McMahon 1997). Cheung & Heath (2007) provide the most nuanced overview of this disadvantage, showing that while visible minorities of both first and second generations do show some evidence of discrimination in gaining employment, minorities who are gainfully employed achieve class status commensurately with their native British counterparts. Additionally, returns to education for visible minority groups appear to work similarly in predicting occupational class, and reduced gains are only found for some visible minority groups in gaining employment—leading the authors to claim that processes of stratification in Great Britain operate generally the same for all ethnic groups.

*A comparative snapshot*

Table 2, an extract from a larger table in Heath & Cheung (2007), presents the ethnic penalties/premiums for a selected group of non-European 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation immigrants and ‘involuntary’ (3<sup>rd</sup>-generation) minorities in both avoiding unemployment and accessing the salariat. These coefficients were extracted from larger country-specific models that also included controls for age, age-squared, education level and marital status—in addition to further controls for 1<sup>st</sup>-generation immigrant groups and some 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation European immigrant groups, varying by country. Although the magnitude of these coefficients cannot be compared directly across countries, as models were run separately by country and gender, what is clear is that within each country patterns of ethnic penalties can be found for some—although not all—racial/ethnic minorities. In Canada, for example, many immigrant groups don’t fare significantly better or worse than their white-Canadian counterparts. Aboriginals, however, suffer significant labor market disadvantage, particularly with regards to avoiding unemployment. The British case similarly shows that multiple ethnic groups suffer penalties in gaining employment; however those same groups do not seem to suffer penalty in accessing the salariat—net of age, education and marital status—compared to their White British counterparts. And in the US, a number of groups exhibit some evidence of discrimination across both labor market outcomes.

In addition to providing evidence that some form of minority penalty continues to exist in the three countries under consideration, Table 2 may also provide some evidence that different regulation of fair employment across nation-states may shape inequality differently. A naïve view of fair employment regulation, for example, might expect such regulation to contribute to an across-the-board amelioration of labor market

disadvantage, for all groups at all junctures. The simplified labor market purview shown in Table 2 provides some early counterevidence of this view. Canada, for example, shows little evidence of minority disadvantage—and even some notable ethnic premiums—for all groups except Lebanese women and Aboriginals, who suffer both in terms of gaining employment and in accessing the salariat. Great Britain, on the other hand, shows penalties for several of its most populous minority groups, and for both genders, but only in terms of employment. The ethnic premium for Caribbean women in Great Britain for salariat access is also notable here as several policies focused specifically on making inroads for this group, specifically through nursing careers. Minorities in the US generally appear to fare similarly to those in Great Britain, with access to employment harder to negotiate than salariat employment, with the exception of the native minority groups. Black Americans and American Indians in the US both suffer considerable disadvantage in both the employment and advancement aspects of the employment terrain. Clearly, as this example shows, fair or equal employment regulations do not clear-cut disadvantage for all groups at all labor market junctures. Rather, cross-nationally, different fair employment regimes may well induce new and different patterns of amelioration. The next section outlines a new method for exploring these patterns of regulation, and the protection that may or may not result, across multiple countries.

<<Insert Table 2 about here>>

### **Comparing ethnic penalties: An alternative approach**

Considering ethnic penalties in a comparative sense requires a new approach to both conceptualizing and measuring ethnic penalties. Consider a simple thought-experiment: If the same racial/ethnic minority—say, a first-generation Bangladeshi—entered the job market in multiple countries simultaneously, (1) what differences might there be across those countries as to how she fares in the labor market, relative to each charter population; and (2) which political or regulatory structures would help to ensure that her skills were translated efficiently into the job market? Much research on ethnic penalties has focused on answering the former question (although not in a way that is directly comparable across countries); however little work has focused on the latter question. Arguably, however, exploring this second question could reveal as much about inequality—and specifically how different regulatory processes or institutions help to shape inequality—as explorations of the first. As such, this section will

outline a new approach to conceptualizing ethnic penalties that allows for a consideration of the role political and regulatory measures play in structuring job market opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities.

Much recent research on ethnic penalties has focused on developing two aspects of model specification: (1) better specification of ethnic/racial identity, often in combination with immigrant-generation—for example, identifying an individual as ‘second-generation Bangladeshi’ as opposed to simply ‘Southeast Asian’ (or even ‘Asian’); and (2) better measures of ‘skills’ (broadly-defined) that might differ systematically across groups and therefore help to explain away net differentials—for example, language fluency or social network composition. Such research has gone a long way towards to more clearly specifying the disadvantages facing specific groups of individuals and discussing—if not always explicitly testing—the micro-level mechanisms underlying evidence of continued disadvantage for particular groups. However, since most work in this arena has been limited to one particular country, the ability to link evidence of disadvantage to macro-level or contextual mechanisms has been limited.

Further, although the approach of maximally-specifying ethnic/racial-generation is certainly the best approach for identifying the most valid penalty associated with one particular ethnic-generation group, the approach does not provide a way for adjudicating between sources of discrimination (or protection) for those individuals with multiple ‘minority’ statuses; in fact, the traditional ethnic penalty approach, in examining individuals by both ethnic/race status and immigrant status, explicitly induces this identification problem. Again returning to our first-generation Bangladeshi, their ethnic penalty could be due to (1) their immigrant status; (2) their visible minority status; or (3) their religious minority status—to name but some possibilities. While there are undoubtedly advantages, therefore, to knowing the expected penalty for an individual of a given ethnic-generation within a given country, it may also be useful to know whether that particular first-generation Bangladeshi might be discriminated against due to her position as an immigrant in Canada, but due to her status as a religious minority in the US.

This approach to ethnic penalties has been applied to comparative work, most comprehensively by Heath & Cheung (2007). Their work went a great way to explore the patterns of labor market disadvantage—in both gross and net terms—that persists across a number of Western countries. In summarizing these individual chapters, the authors were also able to point to some (tenuous) evidence of cross-national patterns—for example,

that Southern Hemisphere minorities tend to fare less poorly in Western labor markets than European or other immigrants, and that second-generation immigrants in nearly all cases face less labor market disadvantage than their first-generation counterparts.

In spite of the ample contribution of this volume, however, its comparative utility remains inherently hamstrung by its continued reliance on nation-state specific categorizations of minorities. Although Heath & Cheung avoided the pitfall of relying on categorizations deemed relevant by official statistics, and choose instead to control for all potential ethnic/racial generation groups that could be designated, such a decision may actually make cross-national comparisons more difficult. Regardless of their popularity or adequacy, there is a sense in which official determinations of salient minority distinctions are made endogenous, though policies and enforcement regimes that are determined with such distinctions in mind.

As scholars of comparative work have long argued, in order to make a concept relevant across multiple contexts, countries or nations, the concept often must be made to be more abstract and inclusive. Smelser (1976), for example, explains, “To make concepts more widely comparative, then, is simultaneously to make them more abstract and inclusive” (p. 176). Smelser suggests, for example, that the concept “administration” is superior to the concept “civil service,” since the latter is linked to a bureaucratic administrative form not found in certain societies.

The approach proposed here, as such, uses a conceptualization of minority penalties that is more abstract—but also more broadly comparative. This approach applies a theoretically-informed measurement strategy to minority categorizations and examines penalties facing groups who are not defined specifically by ethnic/racial-generation characteristics, but rather via their relationship to different political and regulatory structures that protect (or fail to protect) their right to fair employment—in other words, minority groups under consideration are not ethnic or religious or immigrant minorities, but rather more broadly-defined ‘political minorities.’

This approach also draws inspiration from DiPrete (2002), which showed evidence of different mobility regimes protecting women differently from different life course events, such as divorce and impoverishment in the US, Germany and Sweden. As DiPrete shows, labor markets in each country are arranged in ways that may protect individuals in some ways, but fail to protect in others. Germany, for example, attempts to reduce the rate of career-trajectory-altering events, but does little to mitigate the impact or consequence of such events. Conversely,

Sweden puts its effort into mitigating the consequences of such events, rather than minimizing the rate. Finally, the US appears to neither mitigate rate nor consequence. As DiPrete argues, since the fortunes of women generally are often strongly tied to their labor market fortunes, such institutional differences can lead to large differences in conceptualizations of gender equality across countries.

A corollary can easily be made to understanding the labor market opportunities—and larger life chances—of minority groups in different countries, in the sense that certain regulatory schemes may protect certain types of minorities at certain labor market junctures, thus shaping minority inequality in particular ways.

In examining this question, then, the approach outlined here moves questions about mechanisms responsible for ascriptive inequality from the micro-level (individual-level characteristics) to the level of the nation-state (policy and regulatory protections). In other words, whereas prior work on ethnic penalties focused discussion on the (in)ability of particular racial/ethnic group (generations) to effectively parlay their skill sets into employment, this new framework, focuses on the ability of certain nation-states to do a better (or worse) job of *ensuring* the efficient translation of skills sets—even as they vary systematically by group—into labor market opportunities. In other words, under this new approach, evidence of ethnic penalties provides evidence of the limits of current regulatory structures and/or structural holes that exist within current fair employment regulation. Aimed at better examining the mechanisms behind ethnic penalties, and how such mechanisms might link to national policies or institutions. Again returning to our first-generation Bangladeshi: if we find, for example, that she fares considerably worse in all countries than a similarly-qualified member of the charter population, this provides us with some evidence that indigenous regulatory structures, across the board, are failing to protect this particular individual. However, if we find supplementary evidence that, in Canada first-generation immigrants are likely to suffer disadvantage in the labor market but visible minorities are not, whereas in Great Britain visible minorities are the most prone to large ethnic penalties, we can more concretely link the disadvantage suffered by one particular type of immigrant to the political and regulatory structures responsible for ensuring their labor market opportunities.

#### **Axes of comparison: Political minorities & functional equivalence**

In defining axes of comparison, the approach developed here is premised on identifying relevant groups in all countries with similar relationships to regulatory structures that protect (or fail to protect) their right to fair

employment. As such, 'minority' and 'majority' status aren't dictated *a priori* by race or ethnicity, but rather by their relationship to political and regulatory structures. At present, then, five such 'minority' statuses have been defined.

- **Non-citizens:** As policies related to citizenship can shape access to education or employment, do non-citizens fare worse in the labor market than citizens?
- **Immigrants:** As policies related to immigration can shape both the inflow of migrants (e.g., on grounds of skill level or country of origin) but also the rights of immigrants upon entry (e.g., ease of citizenship, protection under fair employment-type legislation). As such, the question of interest is whether individuals who migrate to the country of interest (or the children of individuals who migrate) fare more poorly than similarly qualified charter group members?
- **Visible minorities:** Do those individuals who are visibly not a member of the majority white racial group fare more poorly than similarly qualified charter group members?
- **Religious minorities:** Do those individuals who are not members of the dominant ethno-religious group fare more poorly than similarly qualified members charter-group members?
- **Aboriginal [involuntary] minorities:** Do involuntary minorities (e.g., members of officially-recognized aboriginal groups) fare more poorly than do members of the white reference group?

Three things to note about this particular enumeration of in-groups & out-groups: First, compared to country-specific schemas of ethnic/racial-generation, this list is not necessarily exhaustive. Table 3 presents the ethnic/racial-generation breakdown of groups as presented in Heath & Cheung (2007) for the US, Canada and Great Britain, the representation of each group within the four nation-states under consideration and how each group maps onto the new categorization. As Table 3 shows, some categorizations included in Heath & Cheung (2007) could only be partially—if all all—classified under the new political minority classifications. The 'Other 3' category in Canada, for example, could not be classified as any of the political minority categories, nor could it be considered a charter population. For the other various and sundry 'Other' categories, they could only be classified in terms of immigrant-generation status, but not in reference to other minority statuses. This exclusion is significant as in several cases these 'Other' categories showed significant ethnic penalties; however identification

as ‘Other’ relies explicitly on country-specific inclusions, which diminishes cross-national comparability. For example, returning to our first-generation Bangladeshi—under current measurement standards, while she would have been identified explicitly as a first-generation Bangladeshi by researchers in Great Britain, in the US, she would have fallen under the ‘Other Asian 1’ category, and in Canada, would not have fit within any of the defined categories. As such, while under the proposed schema some individuals may not be categorized as belonging to either a charter population or any of the political minorities specified, heterogeneous and country-specific categorizations of ‘Other’-ness will also be avoided.

Second, as Table 3 also makes clear, the categories included in this new schema are not mutually exclusive; rather each comparison is set up as binary, and many ethnic/racial-generation groups fall under multiple ‘minority’ classifications. Again, our first-generation Bangladeshi individual is classified as each the ‘immigrant,’ ‘visible minority’ and ‘religious minority’ categorizations, as well as most likely a non-citizen. However, this lack of mutual exclusivity gets at the heart of the thought experiment underscoring this new approach—if, for example, we find little evidence of ethnic penalties against visible minorities in Canada, but do find evidence of penalties for first-generation immigrants, this would serve as some evidence that Canada’s legislative initiatives are doing a better job of ensuring that the skills of visible minorities are translated efficiently into job market opportunities than they are for first-generation immigrants.

Third and finally, it should be noted that the comparisons defined above do not exhaust all bases ethnic/racial discrimination discussed in the literature. In particular, differences in skin shade are not included, in spite of the fact that US studies have shown that lighter skinned minorities tend to fare better in the labor market than do their darker-skinned comparators. The reason for this exclusion was two-fold: for one, beyond the most basic ‘visible minority’ differentiation, it is difficult to map differences in skin color onto regulatory policy—and it may well be that any correlation of evidence of discrimination relative to deviation from the majority skin color is little more than evidence of the strength of the disadvantage visible minorities with greater or lesser ‘signal’ strength. In addition, the data sources used for this study did not include relevant measures of skin shade.

#### **Advantages & disadvantages of the political minority approach**

The most obvious disadvantage of this new approach is that, by examining more abstract categorizations within each country, a large amount of intra-group heterogeneity is ignored. In some ways, this is a reversal of

current trends; the approach taken by Heath et al. (2007), for example, is noteworthy for its attempt to break down ethnicity & immigrant classifications in each country as specifically as possible, thus allowing for the clearest view of patterns within each country. Undoubtedly some of these patterns would be missed by the approach outlined here—for example, that second-generation Indians in Great Britain seem not to suffer any type of ethnic penalty in the British labor market, while second-generation Pakistanis do. However, what this more specific approach does not allow for is a direct comparison of ethnic groups across countries, due to the inherent endogeneity of official statistics and other classifications used within each country. Looking at a classification such as this allows each person to only be identified with one group, and therefore with only penalty—constructing a zero-sum classification schema that is constructed with reference to the other groups that populate the particular country of interest. For example, if you are a first-generation Bangladeshi residing in Britain, you may well be identified as a first-generation Bangladeshi; however, that same Bangladeshi residing in the US would likely be identified as Asian, or perhaps Southeast Asian, depending on available cell sizes. The approach used in this paper will get around this endogeneity problem by aggregating upwards and constructing political minority categories that are functionally equivalent across countries.

Further, by estimating penalties for more abstract categorizations of individuals, the contours of ethnic minority disadvantage within and across each country should be clearer. For example, if Canada truly is doing a better job of protecting its visible minorities than its first-generation immigrants, we should see a larger penalty for first-generation immigrants than for visible minorities.

Finally, the construction of functionally-equivalent categorizations of political minorities in each country will allow for a stable measurement to be constructed that can be tracked over time. With current methods, as the demography of ethnic or racial minorities within each country changes over time, categorizations of individuals also change. An individual who was classified as ‘Southeast Asian’ in 1990 might be classified as ‘Bangladeshi’ in 2010, or alternatively just as ‘Asian’—depending on patterns of immigrant inflow or outflow within that country over time. Generally, however, classifying individuals by political minority status should not fall prey to the tyranny of adequate cell size, thus allowing for measures of visible minority penalties to be directly comparable not only across countries, but across countries over time, thus offering more utility for considering longitudinal changes in regulatory schemes.

## Data & methods

Analyses for this paper will use recent Census data from each of the three countries under consideration to examine a variety of labor market outcomes for each of the political minorities under discussion, controlling for typical labor market predictors. In particular, the following data sets will be used: for the US, the 2000 Census 5% PUMS (N=~14 million); for Canada, the 2001 Census 2.7% PUMF (N=~800,000)<sup>2</sup>; and for Great Britain, pooled General Household Surveys from 1996 to 2003 (N=~80,000)<sup>3</sup>. In line with other models of labor market outcomes, data will be limited to the working age population in each country, or men and women aged 18 to 59.

Research on ethnic minorities is often plagued by small cell sizes—as exemplified in Table 1, important minority groups often make up significantly less than 10 percent of the overall population, and therefore are not well-represented by typical surveys of sample size ~1200. To address this shortcoming, researchers have turned to Census data to ensure cell sizes appropriate for multivariate analysis. One further advantage of the alternative method proposed in this paper is that, in using aggregated political minorities as identities of interest in lieu of specific racial/ethnic-generation, cell sizes should not be as large a concern.

For the purposes of this initial exploration, however, larger data sets like the Census allow for replication of a number of country-specific analyses that have been done examining penalties of specific racial/ethnic generation groups and map those onto findings from my alternative approach. As one of the largest drawbacks of this new method is the loss of within-minority group heterogeneity, having access to larger cell sizes will allow assurances that this additional heterogeneity does not systematically bias or skew the results—for example, by iteratively dropping one particular ethnic/racial identity at a time from the larger minority grouping and comparing results. It should be noted, however, that these data sets are imperfect, and not all variables of interest are included in each Census data set (e.g., religious identification is excluded in the US Census or in the British General Household Survey).

In order to explore political minority penalties, for each country a series of five models will be run controlling for political minority status, separately by gender, for each of three labor market-related dependent

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<sup>2</sup> Canada is the only of the three countries with more recent Census data available (2006); in the interest of temporal consistency, the 2001 Census data will be used.

<sup>3</sup> Specifically analyses here use the pooled 1996/97, 1998/1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 General Household Surveys. Additional analyses have been run using the 2001 British Census, however the British Census does not collect data on outcome variable of interest—income—thereby significantly limiting its utility.

variables—avoidance of unemployment; high class status; and salary/wage (logged). For the first two dependent variables, binary logit models will be estimated; for the log-wage variable, a linear model.

### **Variable information**

Tables 4 and 5 present an overview of variables used in the model, as well as their summary statistics, by gender and country.

- *Independent & control variables*

*Political minority status:* Political minority status will be specified via a series of dummy variables. Each individual may be recognized as fitting one or more political minority categories; no political minority statuses, or belonging to the reference (charter) population. The following criteria will be considered baseline; however specific categorizations may vary somewhat by country.

#### ***Political minority variables***

- *Non-citizen:* Individuals who do not hold citizenship in their country of residence will be classified as non-citizens.
- *Non-native/Immigrant:* Individuals indicated as not born with their country of residence are classified as immigrants or non-natives. As available, and following from Heath & Cheung (2007), distinctions between first and second-generation immigrants will be made. Following Heath & Cheung, first-generation immigrants will be considered all foreign-born individuals except for those who arrived at an age earlier than six. Second-generation immigrants will include all foreign-born individuals who arrived prior to age six as well as native-born individuals with two foreign-born parents.
- *Visible minority:* ‘Visible minorities’ will include all individuals who identify with a non-white racial or ethnic category, as well as members of aboriginal groups. Individuals that identify with multiple racial or ethnic categories, including at least one non-white category, will be classified as visible minorities.
- *Religious minority:* Religious minorities will include all individuals who subscribe to a religious tradition that is not mainstream for the country of interest. Examples Moslems, Buddhists, Jewish individuals in all countries.
- *Aboriginal/involuntary minority:* In line with Ogbu’s designation (1978), involuntary minorities include all individuals that identify with a group (or as a descendent of a group) that found itself under particular

state governance against their will. Examples include aboriginal populations in the US and Canada, and African Americans in the US.

### **Control variables**

- *Educational qualifications*: Categorical measure with designations for (1) Primary or no qualifications; (2) Incomplete secondary; (3) Secondary (reference category); (4) Incomplete tertiary; (5) Full tertiary and beyond.
- *Age*: Included as linear term in years as well as squared term (age in years<sup>2</sup>) to account for increasing likelihood of retirement or labor market exit in later years.
- *Marital status*: Three category measure with designations for (1) Single, never married (reference); (2) Married; and (3) Divorced/separated/widowed.
- *Gender*: Due to fundamental differences in occupational distribution, as well as, e.g. job market queuing between men and women, all models will be run separately by gender.
- *Dependent variables*
  - *Avoidance of unemployment*: Following from similar studies, avoidance of unemployment will be with regard to the economically active population—i.e., those individuals who are either employed or unemployed but actively looking for work. Individuals who are currently employed will be coded as “1”; those unemployed but actively looking for work as “0”. Other classes of economic activity—e.g., full time students—will be coded as missing. In all cases, measure corresponds to the week data was recorded.
  - *Occupational class status*: For those individuals who report being employed, models of class status will be considered. In Great Britain and Canada, a five-category Goldthorpe-Heath occupational class scheme will be employed: (1) Salaried; (2) Routine non-manual; (3) Petty bourgeoisie; (4) Skilled manual; (5) Unskilled/less skilled manual. While multinomial models of this five-category scheme will be considered, in the interest of simplicity, a focus will be on binary models examining differences between salaried and non-salaried, in order to examine protection of possibilities for internal promotion. As data on occupational class is not included in the US Census, a measure of class based on prestige will be generated using the Duncan Socio-Economic Index, with high-prestige jobs considered those in the top quartile (SEI>74).

o *Income/wage*: Differences in gross yearly income or wage by political minority status will be examined, controlling for other standard labor market predictors. To control for outliers, income/wage measures will be both censored (\$385,000 in US; £300,000 in Great Britain, C\$250,000 in Canada) and logged. Further, All told, 30 models (five political minorities x three dependent variables x two genders) will be run for each of the three nation-states, for a total of 90 models. Differences will be tested both within and between countries—e.g., within each country, which political minorities suffer most acutely and with regards to which outcome variables? And in which countries does each political minority seem to be most/least protected? For linear models, testing across models (both within and between countries) can be done using Chow tests. For binary and multinomial logit models, however, predicted probabilities (and differences in predicted probabilities) will be used to test for significance, due to the confounding of effect size with residual variance within parameter estimates (cf. Allison 1999; Long 2009).

## **Results**

<<Insert Tables 6A & 6B about here>>

Tables 6A and 6B present the factor change coefficients for the various political minority variables, compared to non-minorities, by country, dependent variable and gender. Due to the size of the data sets being used, it is perhaps not surprising that many of these coefficients turned out to be significantly different from zero; with that in mind, however, the size of the coefficients differed greatly by political minority group and country.

For Canadian men, models for avoidance of unemployment showed significant negative effects of political minority status for all but second-generation immigrants, with the largest effects for involuntary/aboriginal minorities. Compared to non-minorities, involuntary minorities are nearly 70% less likely to avoid unemployment. Other minority groups also appear to suffer penalties, but their odds of facing unemployment are not as steep. Second-generation immigrants, however, indicate a premium in gaining employment, compared to their non-second-generation immigrant counterparts, with their odds being more than 1.5 times as large of avoiding unemployment. This advantage carries over into class access, with second-generation male immigrants also gaining an advantage compared to their non-second-generation immigrant counterparts. Male religious minorities also show a slight premium in gaining salariat access. All other minority groups, however, show a disadvantage of similar magnitude—around 0.8, indicating that they are 20% less likely to be in the salariat compared to their non-

minority counterparts. Compared to the model for unemployment avoidance, these small penalties may indicate that legislative initiatives are doing a better job at protecting minorities once they are employed, but do less well in helping them to reach the job market. The wage model for males indicates a similar pattern, although this time with religious minorities suffering a small penalty and non-citizens and involuntary minorities suffering the largest penalties.

Amongst Canadian women, across the board non-citizens and aboriginals seem to suffer the largest penalties, with visible minorities and first-generation immigrants not far behind. Again, second-generation immigrants carry a premium across the board, and religious minorities suffer a mid-sized penalty only with regards to avoidance of unemployment. Unlike the men, penalties for both salariat access and avoidance of unemployment are quite large for certain minority groups, indicating that perhaps minority women are not as well protected by legislative endeavors as men appear to be.

Amongst British men, it is clear that visible minorities are the least protected minority status, with odds nearly 60% lower of avoiding unemployment and nearly 25% lower of gaining salariat access compared to similar non-minorities. Their wages are also decreased by a factor of .86 compared to non-minorities. Non-citizens suffer disadvantages of a similar magnitude, with half the odds of avoiding unemployment of citizens and an income penalty of nearly 10 percent, *ceteris paribus*. Both immigrant groups also suffer a disadvantage in gaining employment—however they fare better in both accessing the upper class and in terms of wage, in line with Heath & Cheung's (2007) findings. While a disadvantage still exists for all groups in terms of income, it is less steep than the employment penalty.

Models for British women tell a slightly different—although clearly related—story. As with men, British minority women see employment penalties across the board, ranging from a .26 decrease in odds of employment for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants to a .62 decrease in odds for visible minority women, all else being equal. In terms of salariat access and income, however, only visible minorities see any significant evidence of penalties. Rather, both first-generation immigrants and non-citizens see a small wage premium, of around 8%, compared to non-minority women with the same qualifications. Visible minorities do also suffer a significant penalty in gaining salariat access. As with the Canadian case, it appears that legislative initiatives are doing a much better job of ensuring

occupational class access than of ensuring that individuals with minority standing have equal access to job market opportunities.

Amongst US men, visible minorities and involuntary minorities stand out for experiencing severe disadvantage both in avoiding unemployment and in holding higher-prestige jobs. The odds of an involuntary minority avoiding unemployment compared to a non-minority are reduced by a factor of nearly 0.6, and of having a high-prestige job, by a factor of nearly 0.4, all else being equal. Interestingly, however, non-citizens and immigrants in the US face few if any minority penalties, and in most cases see a premium compared to citizens. Penalties for these groups show up only with regard to wages, and appear to be relatively small.

For US women, however, such a pattern does not hold, as all four minority groups suffer penalties in both avoiding unemployment and holding a higher-prestige job, compared to their non-minority counterparts. Again, visible minorities and involuntary minorities are particularly disadvantaged when it comes to avoiding unemployment, with each minority groups odds reduced by a factor of nearly 0.50 compared to their non-minority counterparts. Interestingly, however, female visible minorities do not suffer a significant penalty with regard to wages—perhaps indicating that regulation of wages for visible minorities is working.

**<<Insert Figures 1A & B about here>>**

The factor change coefficients presented in Tables 6A & 6B can help to paint a picture of minority disadvantage both within and between countries, but examining discrete change in predicted probabilities can often show the magnitudes of effects that are less obvious with odds ratios only. As such, Figures 1 through 3 present plots of discrete change coefficients for each dependent variable, by gender, country and minority. Discrete change coefficients calculate the difference between two predicted probabilities—in this case, one where minority status was present and one where it was not, holding all other variables at their country and gender-specific mean values. Because the magnitude of discrete change coefficients depend on, amongst other things, the baseline probability of an outcome, they can provide us a view into the impact that a change in the odds has on the predicted probability of an individual, for example, avoiding unemployment or gaining access to higher-class employment.

In line with work by Allison (1999) and Long (2009), discrete change coefficients also allow us to assess the significance of a particular change by examining the 95% confidence intervals around each discrete change. In

the plots presented here, this confidence interval is included as a range plot on each bar. These range plots allow us to examine significance for any one bar—if the plot doesn't cross the zero-line, it can be considered a significant difference in predicted probabilities—but also provide a conservative test of difference between minority groups or countries. For ease of interpretation and to take into account differences in currency, the discrete change in actual wage (as opposed to log-wage) as the proportion of the average wage for each country, by gender has been plotted in Figures 3A and 3B.

### *Employment*

Discrete change coefficients for avoidance of unemployment for men and women are presented in Figures 1A & 1B. In the men's plot, amongst an array of negative discrete changes, the change for aboriginal men in Canada stands out as significantly larger than the rest—while the average unemployment rate for Canadian men is around five percent, aboriginal males in Canada see an unemployment rate of more than 13 percent, or nearly three times as large, net of age, education and marital status. Penalties for all four British minority groups are also significant, large and negative—ranging from nearly five percentage point increase in unemployment for visible minority males down to a two percentage point penalty for second-generation immigrants in Great Britain. In the US, both visible minorities and aboriginals also experience significant negative penalties compared to their non-minority counterparts, but of a smaller magnitude than those found in Canada and Great Britain (though of course it should be noted that overall unemployment in the US in 2000 was lower than elsewhere).

There is some evidence of employment premiums in both the US and Canada. In Canada, second-generation immigrant males have a predicted probability of employment that is two percentage points larger than their non-minority counterparts; in the US, non-citizens and immigrants (omnibus) also see a significant penalty—albeit of only about one additional percentage point.

Compared to men, discrete change in employment for women shows more significant minority penalties, especially within the US; however across the board, minority penalties in the US are smaller than those in Great Britain or Canada. Canadian aboriginal women again experience a substantial penalty in securing employment, of around seven percent, but penalties for non-citizen Canadian women and visible minority British women are all of similar size. Unlike with the employment models for men, here we only find one significant premium—for second-generation immigrant women in Canada.

### *Upper-class standing*

Figures 2A and 2B present discrete change coefficients for upper-class standing, by gender, country and minority group, with other variables held at country and gender specific means. For minority men in both the US and Great Britain, the story here is a mixed bag. Both aboriginal and visible minority men in the US see large penalties in gaining access to higher-status occupations—for visible minorities, this penalty is nearly four percentage points; for aboriginals it is nearly double that at 7 percentage points. This is particularly noteworthy given that the baseline for upper-class standing in the US is lower than in Canada or Great Britain. Undoubtedly much of this penalty for both groups is driven by explicit discrimination against African-Americans. Conversely, neither non-citizen males in the US nor immigrants appear to suffer any penalty—and, in fact, in the latter case may even see a small premium—in gaining access to higher status occupations. Similarly in Britain, a significant minority penalty is only found for visible minorities; in all other cases differences are not significant at the 0.05 level. The penalty for visible minorities in Great Britain, however, is quite large, reducing the predicted probability of salariat employment from .38 to .32, for an individual at the gender-average for all other variables in the model.

The plot for discrete change in upper-class standing for women is dominated by large negative effects for Canadian minorities, particularly non-citizens, visible minorities and first-generation immigrants—all of whom have a significantly lower predicted probability of salariat employment than their non-minority counterparts. The largest penalty is for non-citizens, who see a .12 drop in predicted probability compared to citizens. Conversely, however, aboriginal women and second-generation immigrant women both see small premiums in accessing the salariat. American women minorities—across the board—experience penalties in accessing the salariat, and while these penalties are not as large as the penalties for Canadian women, it should be noted that the baseline probability for salariat employment for women in Canada is 0.44, compared to 0.28 in the US. With the exception of visible minorities who experience a small penalty, British minority women are not significantly different from non-minority women in their probability of salariat employment.

### *Income/wage*

Figures 3A and 3B present the discrete change in yearly income or wage by country and minority group, standardized as a proportion of the gender-average wage in each country. As the plot shows, wage penalties for minorities are steepest in Canada, for non-citizen, aboriginal and first-generation immigrant males; however

Canada also shows evidence of a small wage premium for second-generation immigrants as well as for religious minorities, compared to equivalent non-minorities. Britain and the US also show significant wage penalties for minority men, although of smaller magnitude—for example non-citizen males in the US suffer a penalty of about US\$3,000, while in Canada they lose more than C\$8,000. The presence of significant wage penalties for British minority men seems to disprove theories of job insulation, or that individuals are protected from discrimination once they gain access to employment. Rather, the model here finds penalties of up to .15 of the average salary, or more than £3500, for visible minority men compared to non-minority men.

As with men, wages for minority women in Canada are also below those of non-minority women, particularly for non-citizens, aboriginals and first-generation immigrants. Also as with men, female second-generation Canadian immigrants see a small but significant wage premium. Amongst US minority women, wage penalties are significant but small--In fact, the only significant and substantial penalty is for non-citizen women, of around \$1500. Thus while while minority women in the US seem to have a difficult time both gaining employment and gaining access to higher-class occupations, they are not paid much less than their non-minority women counterparts. Few if any penalties in wages are seen for British women, although premiums for both non-citizens and first-generation immigrants are found, of order £800 each.

### **Discussion & conclusion**

Understanding minority inequality within any country requires an understanding of history, of legal and political battles, and of social problematization—amongst other social processes. To fully examine the contours of inequality within one country is a feat; to do so across several may even seem misguided. As this paper begins to illustrate, however, even simple comparisons across countries can illuminate interesting and important differences. The results of this paper, for example, have shown that while within Canada, non-citizens suffer disadvantage on a par with aboriginal groups, they suffer far less disadvantage in the US. Likely this is related to how each country conceptualizes and grants citizenship within its borders—if citizenship is a necessary qualification for employment, for example, non-citizens may well not even enter the labor market, or would do so only when special employment provisions were made well in advance.

But it's not just with minority group that inequality can differ—different labor market junctures can also serve to illuminate how political minorities fare differently across different contexts. In Canada, for example,

certain minority groups seem to suffer very harsh penalties in gaining employment, but then face only more minor penalties in accessing certain class levels. Conversely, American women seem to face harsh penalties in both gaining employment and accessing high-prestige jobs, but suffer very few wage penalties, compared to their non-minority counterparts. There are, of course, various ways of explaining this finding—but identification is the first step.

One thing that is noticeably absent from the findings of this paper is much evidence of ethnic premiums. Given the advent of (even mollified versions of) affirmative action or positive action in both the US and Canada, one would expect to see some evidence that certain minorities were actually faring better than their non-minority counterparts. Potential evidence of this type shows up only amongst second-generation immigrants in Canada, who do see some (albeit modest) premiums. The largest premiums likely come in their access to salariat employment—increasing the predicted probability by about 3 percentage points for men and 4 percentage points for women, compared to non-minority counterparts. In the US, only very small premiums are found, and only for non-native minority groups (non-citizens and immigrants); thus it is unlikely that such premiums would be a result of any form of affirmative action. Within Britain we find evidence of significant minority premiums only for minority women—perhaps not surprising given Britain’s long-standing reluctance to adopt any forms of ‘positive action.’

Further work in this area will hope to map some of the findings of this paper onto other legislative and political differences that exist between countries in conceptualizing and managing employment equality, or fair employment. As work by scholars like Bloemraad (2009), Dobbin (2009) and Heath & Cheung (2007) have made clear, labor market inequality of minority groups is always made, constructed at the nexus of political, legal and economic bodies. Over the past 40 years, most societies have started to work towards defining their version of fair employment, but each version will not work identically in ameliorating inequality for all minority groups at all junctures. This paper, and the method described within, provide a start in dissecting whose methods for work for whom, and when.

## Tables & figures

**Table 1: Population make-up by dominant and minority groups in each nation-state**

Country	“Dominant” racial/ethnic group	“Minority” groups & percentage of population
USA <sup>1</sup>	Non-Hispanic whites: 65.6%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Black: 12.2%</li> <li>• Hispanic: 15.4%</li> <li>• American Indian/Alaskan native: 0.7%</li> <li>• Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 0.1%</li> <li>• Multi-racial: 1.5%</li> </ul>
Canada <sup>2</sup>	Non-aboriginal & not visible minority: 78.4% <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aboriginal: 5.4%</li> <li>• Chinese: 3.9%</li> <li>• South Asian: 4.0%</li> <li>• Other Asian: 2.0%</li> <li>• Black: 2.5%</li> <li>• Filipino: 1.3%</li> <li>• Latin American: 1.0%</li> <li>• Arab: 0.8%</li> <li>• Other visible minority: 0.6%</li> </ul>
Great Britain <sup>4</sup>	British ancestry: 84.3%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• African commonwealth: 0.3%</li> <li>• Caribbean: 1.0%</li> <li>• Indian: 1.5%</li> <li>• Pakistani/Bangladeshi: 1.0%</li> <li>• Irish: 1.0%</li> <li>• West European: 1.0%</li> <li>• Other/multiple ancestry: 9.5%<sup>5</sup></li> </ul>

1: Data taken from “2008 National Characteristics Estimates: Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (NC-EST2008-03)”, US Census Bureau.

2: Data taken from “Selected Demographic, Cultural, Educational, Labour Force and Income Characteristics (830), Mother Tongue (4), Age Groups (8A) and Sex (3) for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Divisions and Census Subdivisions, 2006 Census - 20% Sample Data”, Statistics Canada. Online at <http://bit.ly/ZiaA5>.

3: The Employment Equity Act of Canada defines visible minorities as ‘persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.’ Aboriginals, or individuals who reported at least one Aboriginal ancestry (North American Indian, Métis or Inuit) to the ethnic origin question, are also excluded from this ‘dominant’ group.

4: Numbers from Cheung & Heath 2007: p. 517, using pooled General Household Survey 1991-2001.

5: Group is largely comprised of individuals of multiple ancestries, for example an individual who had one parent born in India and a second parent born in Britain.

**Table 2: Ethnic penalties [premiums] in second-generation of non-European ancestry and 'involuntary' minorities, by country and gender: Parameter estimates from logistic regression for avoidance of unemployment and salariat employment (from Heath & Cheung 2007)**

	Avoidance of unemployment		Access to the salariat	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<b>Canada:</b>				
Lebanese	+0.11	<b>-1.02</b>	+0.64	-0.18
Chinese	+0.14	-0.08	<b>+0.96</b>	<b>+0.57</b>
Indian	-0.03	-0.03	<b>+0.32</b>	<b>+0.38</b>
Caribbean	<b>-0.49</b>	<b>-0.48*</b>	+0.12	<b>+0.32</b>
African	-0.05	-0.21	+0.15	-0.30
Filipino	+0.77	+0.37	+0.45	-0.31
Aboriginal	<b>-1.50</b>	<b>-1.28</b>	<b>-0.44*</b>	-0.13*
<b>Great Britain:</b>				
Indian	<b>-0.43*</b>	<b>-0.86</b>	+0.67	+0.00
Caribbean	<b>-0.80</b>	<b>-0.74</b>	-0.11	<b>+0.62</b>
Pakistani	<b>-1.11</b>	<b>-1.13</b>	-0.17	-0.15
<b>US:</b>				
East Asian	+0.39	+0.87	-0.06	-0.03
Cuban	+0.19	+0.02	<b>+0.52</b>	<b>+0.86</b>
Filipino	-0.41	-0.03	+0.27	+0.16
Dominican	<b>-0.67</b>	<b>-0.91</b>	+0.29	+0.04
Black [2 <sup>nd</sup> gen]	<b>-0.84</b>	<b>-1.11</b>	-0.15*	-0.32*
Mexican	<b>-0.39</b>	<b>-0.65</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	+0.37
Puerto Rican	<b>-1.08</b>	<b>-0.77</b>	-0.19	-0.02
African American	<b>-0.91*</b>	<b>-0.83</b>	<b>-0.77</b>	<b>-0.67*</b>
American Indian	<b>-1.07</b>	<b>-0.99</b>	<b>-0.35</b>	<b>-0.25</b>

Note: Logit coefficients for models run separately for each country & each gender, controlling for age & age-squared, education, marital status & time/period (as applicable). Bold coefficients are significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level or better, net of other variables, in comparison to dominant ethnic/racial group. An asterisk indicates a significant interaction with education. The parameter estimate thus represents the ethnic penalty (premium) for an individual with full secondary education. Salariat access estimates taken from full five-category multinomial model, with manual labor as the omitted category.

**Table 3: Race/ethnic-generation breakdowns from Heath & Cheung (2007), by country of representation & relevant political minority measure**

Group	Represented?			Political minority?			
	US	Canada	GB	Immigrant	Visible minority	Relig. minority	Involuntary minority
Aboriginal 3		x			x		x
African 1		x	x	x	x		
African 2		x	x	x	x		
African-American 3	x				x		x [US]
American Indian	x				x		x
Asians in Hawaii 3	x						
Asians outside Hawaii 3	x				x		
Bangladeshi 1			x	x	x	x	
Bangladeshi 2			x	x	x	x	
Black 1	x			x	x		
Black 2	x			x	x		
British 1		x		x			
British 2		x		x			
British 3		x	x				
Canadian 1	x			x			
Canadian 2	x			x			
Canadian 3		x					
Caribbean 1		x	x	x	x		
Caribbean 2		x	x	x	x		
Caribbean 3		x		x	x		
Chinese 1		x	x	x	x	x	
Chinese 2		x		x	x	x	
Chinese 3		x		x		x	
Cuban 1	x			x	x		
Cuban 2	x			x	x		
Dominican 1	x			x	x		
Dominican 2	x			x	x		
East Asian 1	x			x	x	x	
East Asian 2	x			x	x	x	
Filipino 1	x	x		x	x		
Filipino 2	x	x		x	x		
French 1		x		x			
French 2		x		x			
French 3		x					x [Can]
German 1	x	x		x			
German 2	x	x		x			
German 3		x					
Indian 1		x	x	x	x	x	
Indian 2		x	x	x	x	x	
Irish 1	x	x		x			
Irish 2	x	x		x			

Group	Represented?			Political minority?			
	US	Canada	UK: GB	Immigrant	Visible minority	Relig. minority	Involuntary minority
Irish 3		x					
Italian 1	x	x		x			
Italian 2	x	x		x			
Italian 3		x					
Jewish 1		x				x	
Jewish 2		x				x	
Jewish 3		x				x	
Lebanese 1		x		x	x	x	
Lebanese 2		x		x	x	x	
Mexican 1	x			x	x		
Mexican 2	x			x	x		
Mexican 3	x				x		
Mixed-Black 1			x	x	x	x	
Mixed-Black 2			x	x	x	x	
Mixed-Other 1			x	x	x	x	
Mixed-Other 2			x	x	x	x	
Multiple aboriginal 3		x			x		x
Multiple charter 3		x					
Native-born, non-hispanic White	x						
Other 1			x	x	x	x	
Other 2			x	x	x	x	
Other 3			x				
Pakistani 1			x	x	x	x	
Pakistani 2			x	x	x	x	
Polish 1	x	x		x			
Polish 2	x	x		x			
Polish 3		x					
Puerto Rican 1	x			x	x		
Puerto Rican 2	x			x	x		
Puerto Rican 3	x				x		
Ukrainian 1		x		x			
Ukrainian 2		x		x			
Ukrainian 3		x					
White			x				

**Table 4: Variable descriptions**

Variable	Description & coding	Notes
<b>Political minority status</b> 1 = Minority 0 = Non-minority		
Visible minority?	Does the individual belong to a racial or ethnic minority category that could be identified visually?	For all countries, white considered majority. All non-whites (including multiple-race identifiers) coded as visible minority.
Non-native/immigrant status?	Did the individual immigrate to the US OR was the individual born in a country other than the US?	For Canada and Great Britain, distinction between 1 <sup>st</sup> generation & 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant <sup>4</sup> .
Non-citizen?	Is the individual a citizen of their country of residence?	As available, all pathways to citizenship included.
Involuntary/Aboriginal?	Is the individual a member of an aboriginal group?	US & Canada only. In Canada, aboriginal groups are defined as First Nations, Inuit and Métis. In the US, aboriginal groups include American Indians and African-Americans.
Religious minority?	Does the individual identify as a religion other than the majority religion?	Canada & Great Britain only. For all countries, Judeo-Christianity considered majority; Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and non-religious (among others) all considered minority.
<b>Dependent variables</b>		
Avoidance of unemployment	During the week prior, was the individual unemployed and actively seeking employment?	In line with ILO standard definition of unemployment, excludes unemployed who were not active in the prior week.
Income (log)	For the prior year, what was the individual's wage or income?	In country-specific currency. Capped at C\$200,000 (Canada); US\$385,000 (US); £300,000. Logged in model.
Upper-class standing	Does the individual belong to the salariat or have a high prestige occupation?	For Canada and Great Britain: five-class Goldthorpe-Heath class schema used, with salariat membership proxy for high-class membership. For US: Duncan Socio-Economic Index used, with SEI in highest quartile used as proxy for high-prestige occupation.
<b>Control variables<sup>5</sup></b>		
Gender	Male & Female	All models run separately by gender.
Age	In years	
Age <sup>2</sup>	In years-squared	
Marital status	1 = Single 2 = Married 3 = Divorced, Separated or Widowed	Legal definitions preferred over historical, as available.
Educational attainment	1 = None/primary 2 = Incomplete secondary 3 = Complete secondary 4 = Incomplete tertiary 5 = Complete tertiary	Completion of any advanced degree (college, university, technical) included in (5) Complete tertiary.

<sup>4</sup> First-generation immigrants are defined as individuals who immigrated after the beginning of their schooling (generally considered 6+ years of age); second-generation immigrants are defined as those who immigrated prior to 6 years of age or were born of two first-generation immigrants.

<sup>5</sup> Models for Great Britain also include binary controls for year (in reference to 1996) as data merged over multiple years (1996-2003).

**Table 5: Descriptive statistics, by country & gender**

		Means & Standard deviations (as applicable)					
<i>Minority status indicators</i>	Range	Can: Men	Can: Women	GB: Men	GB: Women	US: Men	US: Women
Visible minority?	0 - 1	0.14	0.14	0.07	0.07	0.23	0.24
Non-native/immigrant status?	0 - 1	0.28	0.28	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.14
<i>First-generation?</i>	0 - 1	0.18	0.19	0.07	0.08	--	--
<i>Second-generation?</i>	0 - 1	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.05	--	--
Non-citizen?	0 - 1	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08
Aboriginal?	0 - 1	0.03	0.03	--	--	0.10	0.12
Religious minority?	0 - 1	0.28	0.23	--	--	--	--
<b><i>Dependent variables</i></b>							
Unemployed	0 - 1	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
Income from wage	Canada: C\$2-200,000 US: US\$4-\$385,000 GB: £2-£300,000	C\$ 38,222.5 (SD=30,430.5)	C\$25,094.6 (SD=19,905.8)	£22,753.13 (SD=20,102.6)	£12,898.02 (SD=14,435.6)	US\$39,561.7 (SD=44,247.5)	US\$24,296.8 (SD= 25,581.1)
Upper class standing	0 - 1	0.33	0.44	0.39	0.33	0.28	0.28
<b><i>Control variables</i></b>							
Age	US & Can: 18-59 GB: 16-59	38.37 (SD=11.52)	38.98 (SD=11.51)	38.79 (SD=11.48)	37.35 (SD=12.28)	37.93 (SD=11.53)	38.18 (SD=11.48)
Marital status:							
<i>Single</i>	0 - 1	0.31	0.24	0.54	0.54	0.30	0.24
<i>Married</i>	0-1	0.62	0.64	0.39	0.34	0.58	0.59
<i>Divorced/sep/widowed</i>	0-1	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.17
Educational attainment:							
None/Primary	0 - 1	0.01	0.01	0.18	0.21	0.05	0.04
Incomplete Secondary	0 - 1	0.22	0.19	0.34	0.39	0.13	0.11
Complete Secondary	0 - 1	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.29	0.28
Incomplete Tertiary	0 - 1	0.22	0.19	0.11	0.11	0.23	0.25
Complete Tertiary	0 - 1	0.36	0.43	0.19	0.15	0.29	0.31
N=		237,212	243,089	33,757	36,276	3,879,216	4,032,816

NB: Standard deviations not provided for binary variables. Means for binary variables can be interpreted as the proportion of the group that identifies with a particular group or characteristic (e.g., visible minority).

**Table 6A: Factor change coefficients, minority variables only: MEN**

	Avoidance of unemployment	Upper-class standing	Log-wage
<b>CANADA</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>0.611</b> (-12.49)	<b>0.824</b> (-7.61)	<b>0.676</b> (-37.05)
Visible minority	<b>0.771</b> (-8.82)	<b>0.817</b> (-11.59)	<b>0.722</b> (-46.35)
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>0.319</b> (-27.35)	<b>0.818</b> (-4.38)	<b>0.690</b> (-24.73)
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.873</b> (-4.98)	<b>0.841</b> (-11.64)	<b>0.807</b> (-34.54)
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>1.512</b> (10.12)	<b>1.199</b> (9.42)	<b>1.112</b> (13.86)
Religious minority	<b>0.825</b> (-8.07)	<b>1.106</b> (7.54)	<b>0.928</b> (-13.61)
N=	190,294	179,733	194,088
<b>GREAT BRITAIN</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>0.518</b> (-7.71)	0.993 (-0.12)	<b>0.904</b> (-5.73)
Visible minority	<b>0.432</b> (-8.94)	<b>0.779</b> (-3.63)	<b>0.806</b> (-10.10)
Aboriginal/ involuntary minority	--	--	--
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.505</b> (-7.22)	0.938 (-1.01)	<b>0.879</b> (-6.36)
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.699</b> (-3.11)	1.057 (0.79)	0.958 (-1.93)
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	25,978	26,719	19,607
<b>USA</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>1.312</b> (22.66)	<b>0.983</b> (-2.94)	<b>0.893</b> (-62.97)
Visible minority	<b>0.567</b> (-81.37)	<b>0.787</b> (-66.37)	<b>0.835</b> (-153.52)
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>0.423</b> (-106.39)	<b>0.629</b> (-86.75)	<b>0.796</b> (-140.56)
Immigrant (omnibus)	<b>1.263</b> (23.13)	<b>1.054</b> (12.65)	<b>0.926</b> (-53.43)
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	2,931,552	3,645,121	3,226,763


Note: Odds ratios from binary logit model. T-statistics shown in parentheses. Emboldened coefficients indicate significance at the p=0.05 level or better. Italicized coefficients indicate a minority premium. Coefficients for control variables (age, age<sup>2</sup>, education, marital status) not shown but available on request.

**Table 6B: Factor change coefficients, minority variables only: WOMEN**


	Avoidance of unemployment	Upper-class standing	Log-wage
<b>CANADA</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>0.472</b> <i>(-19.08)</i>	<b>0.593</b> <i>(-19.79)</i>	<b>0.709</b> <i>(-28.79)</i>
Visible minority	<b>0.626</b> <i>(-15.68)</i>	<b>0.589</b> <i>(-30.27)</i>	<b>0.849</b> <i>(-21.07)</i>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>0.401</b> <i>(-18.49)</i>	<b>1.109</b> <i>(2.64)</i>	<b>0.767</b> <i>(-15.68)</i>
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.673</b> <i>(-14.31)</i>	<b>0.642</b> <i>(-29.96)</i>	<b>0.879</b> <i>(-18.56)</i>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>1.587</b> <i>(9.54)</i>	<b>1.212</b> <i>(10.01)</i>	<b>1.155</b> <i>(16.14)</i>
Religious minority	<b>0.737</b> <i>(-11.21)</i>	<b>0.917</b> <i>(-6.13)</i>	<b>0.976</b> <i>(-3.71)</i>
N=	167,523	159,252	181,744
<b>GREAT BRITAIN</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>0.546</b> <i>(-5.95)</i>	<i>1.031</i> <i>(0.58)</i>	<b>1.082</b> <i>(3.66)</i>
Visible minority	<b>0.389</b> <i>(-8.85)</i>	<b>0.826</b> <i>(-2.79)</i>	0.983 <i>(-0.64)</i>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	--	--	--
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.490</b> <i>(-6.44)</i>	<i>1.003</i> <i>(0.05)</i>	<b>1.089</b> <i>(3.48)</i>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.737</b> <i>(-2.26)</i>	<i>1.062</i> <i>(0.90)</i>	<i>1.022</i> <i>(0.82)</i>
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	24,871	30,766	21,019
<b>USA</b>			
Non-citizen	<b>0.757</b> <i>(-23.77)</i>	<b>0.782</b> <i>(-39.73)</i>	<b>0.925</b> <i>(-30.97)</i>
Visible minority	<b>0.581</b> <i>(-77.24)</i>	<b>0.839</b> <i>(-52.55)</i>	1.00 <i>(0.095)</i>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>0.526</b> <i>(-78.75)</i>	<b>0.852</b> <i>(-37.09)</i>	<b>0.972</b> <i>(-16.36)</i>
Immigrant (omnibus)	<b>0.844</b> <i>(-17.30)</i>	<b>0.842</b> <i>(-39.89)</i>	<b>1.01</b> <i>(7.15)</i>
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	2,503,760	3,481,547	2,987,943

Note: Odds ratios from binary logit model. T-statistics shown in parentheses. Emboldened coefficients indicate significance at the p=0.05 level or better. Italicized coefficients indicate a minority premium. Coefficients for control variables (age, age<sup>2</sup>, education, marital status) not shown but available on request.


**Figure 1A: Discrete change in predicted probability of employment, by minority status: MEN**




**Figure 1B: Discrete change in predicted probability of employment, by minority status: WOMEN**




**Figure 2A: Discrete change in predicted probability of upper-class standing, by minority status: MEN**




**Figure 2B: Discrete change in predicted probability of upper-class standing, by minority status: WOMEN**



**Figure 3A: Discrete change in income, as proportion of gender-country-average, by minority status: MEN**



**Figure 3B: Discrete change in income, as proportion of gender-country-average, by minority status: WOMEN**



## Appendix 1: Discrete change, by country, dependent variable &amp; minority status: MEN

	Avoidance of unemployment	Upper-class standing	Wage
<b>CANADA</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.94)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.33)</b>	<b>(Baseline=C\$38,222.5)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>-0.027</b>	<b>-0.038</b>	<b>-8233.60</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>-0.039</b>	<b>-7214.91</b>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>-0.086</b>	<b>-0.039</b>	<b>-7795.77</b>
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.006</b>	<b>-0.034</b>	<b>-5009.09</b>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.016</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>2894.75</b>
Religious minority	<b>-0.008</b>	<b>0.021</b>	<b>-1868.53</b>
N=	190,294	179,733	194,088
<b>GREAT BRITAIN</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.95)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.39)</b>	<b>(Baseline=£22,753.13)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>-0.033</b>	-0.001	<b>-1747.89</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.046</b>	<b>-0.057</b>	<b>-3550.07</b>
Aboriginal/ involuntary minority	--	--	--
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.035</b>	-0.0149	<b>-2191.85</b>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.016</b>	<i>0.013</i>	-753.87
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	25,978	26,719	19,607
<b>USA</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.96)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.28)</b>	<b>(Baseline=US\$39,561.7)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>0.006</b>	<b>-0.003</b>	<b>-2779.46</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.017</b>	<b>-0.039</b>	<b>-4388.58</b>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>-0.032</b>	<b>-0.071</b>	<b>-5337.28</b>
Immigrant (omnibus)	<b>0.006</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>-1904.05</b>
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	2,931,552	3,645,121	3,226,763

Note: Discrete change in predicted probabilities calculated holding all other variables are their country & gender-specific means. Emboldened coefficients indicate significant discrete changes (according to 95% confidence intervals around change). Italicized coefficients indicate minority premium.

## Appendix 2: Discrete change, by country, dependent variable & minority status: WOMEN

	Avoidance of unemployment	Upper-class standing	Wage
<b>CANADA</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.95)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.44)</b>	<b>(Baseline=C\$25,094.6)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>-0.044</b>	<b>-0.120</b>	<b>-4699.52</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.023</b>	<b>-0.123</b>	<b>-2451.04</b>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>-0.058</b>	<b>0.025</b>	<b>-3718.24</b>
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.019</b>	<b>-0.105</b>	<b>-1965.42</b>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>0.017</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>2445.3147</b>
Religious minority	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>-0.021</b>	<b>-390.71604</b>
N=	167,523	159,252	181,744
<b>GREAT BRITAIN</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.96)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.33)</b>	<b>(Baseline=£12,898.02)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>-0.023</b>	<i>0.006</i>	<b>744.75</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.042</b>	<b>-0.037</b>	<i>153.96</i>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	--	--	--
Immigrant (omnibus)			
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.029</b>	<i>0.001</i>	<b>809.06</b>
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	<b>-0.011</b>	<i>0.013</i>	<i>204.95</i>
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	24,871	30,766	21,019
<b>USA</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.96)</b>	<b>(Baseline=0.28)</b>	<b>(Baseline=US\$24,296.8)</b>
Non-citizen	<b>-0.009</b>	<b>-0.043</b>	<b>-1175.46</b>
Visible minority	<b>-0.019</b>	<b>-0.031</b>	<i>20.43</i>
Aboriginal/involuntary minority	<b>-0.024</b>	<b>-0.029</b>	<b>-440.24</b>
Immigrant (omnibus)	<b>-0.005</b>	<b>-0.031</b>	<b>205.66</b>
<i>1<sup>st</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> generation</i>	--	--	--
Religious minority	--	--	--
N=	2,503,760	3,481,547	2,987,943

Note: Discrete change in predicted probability calculated holding all other variables at their country and gender-specific means. Emboldened coefficients indicate significant discrete changes (according to 95% confidence intervals around change). Italicized coefficients indicate minority premium.